Samuel Shirley's splendid new translation, with critical annotation reflecting research of the last half-century, is the only edition of the complete text of Spinoza's correspondence available in English. An historical-philosophical Introduction, detailed annotation, a chronology, and a bibliography are also included.

Bill New's (1999) thoughtful paper has performed the valuable service of clarifying the meaning and the policy implications of paternalism. His careful formulation delimits the domain of justified state paternalism. Having argued successfully, in our view, for a narrow ambit, New proceeds to identify situations that justify paternalism. This comment is written in the spirit of a friendly reformulation that refines and improves the specification of when paternalism is justified. Our argument is two-fold. First, we argue that New's formulation, properly (...) understood, will not readily permit the paternalistic interventions he argues are justified. Second, we identify a class of potentially justified interventions that have paternalistic aspects, but which are neither strictly paternalistic nor market-failure remedies. (shrink)

As we look beyond our terrestrial boundary to a multi-planetary future for humankind, it becomes paramount to anticipate the challenges of various human factors on the most likely scenario for this future: permanent human settlement of Mars. Even if technical hurdles are circumvented to provide adequate resources for basic physiological and psychological needs, Homo sapiens will not survive on an alien planet if a dysfunctional psyche prohibits the utilization of these resources. No matter how far we soar into the stars, (...) our psychologies for future generations will be forever tethered to the totality of our surroundings. By shaping our environment toward survival and welfare during the voyage to Mars and in a Martian colony, we indirectly shape our psyches and prepare them for a mission of unprecedented alienation and duration. Once on Mars, human factors such as leadership structure, social organization and code of conduct, group size, gender balance, developmental cycle, mobility, length of stay and the ecological settings and type and manner of subsistence, will create a novel Martian culture. The degree that settlers are severed from the Earth will affect how radically foreign this culture will be when compared with cultures on Earth. (shrink)

This article deals with the aesthetics of the art documentary of the 1940s and 1950s, which can be considered as the Golden Age of the genre. Prior to the breakthrough of television in Europe, which would usurp and standardize the art documentary, cinematic reproductions of artworks resulted in experimental shorts that were highly self-reflexive. These films became visual laboratories to investigate the tensions between movement and stasis, the two- and three-dimensional, and the real and the artificial—a film on art was (...) self-consciously presented as an art film. Focusing on La Leggenda di Sant’Orsola by Luciano Emmer and Le Monde de Paul Delvaux by Henri Storck, this article also investigates how the animation of the static image by the film medium relates to Surrealist practices. (shrink)

Matter and Form explores the relationship between natural science and political philosophy from the classical to contemporary eras, taking an interdisciplinary approach to the philosophic understanding of the structure and process of the natural world and its impact on the history of political philosophy. It illuminates the importance of philosophic reflection on material nature to moral and political theorizing, mediating between the sciences and humanities and making a contribution to ending the isolation between them.

Before going further, it will be helpful to consider briefly the notion that novelty per se is a fundamental human need. Experiments with human beings, as well as with animals, indicate that the maintenance of normal, successful behavior depends upon an adequate level of incoming stimulation—or, as some have put it, of novelty.2 But lumping all novelty together is misleading. At least three kinds of novelty need to be distinguished. Some novel patterns arise out of, or represent, changes in the (...) fundamental rules governing the organization of musical processes and structures. By significantly weakening our comprehension of the musical relationships presented—undermining not only our understanding of what is past but our ability to envisage what is to come—such systemic change seriously threatens our sense of psychic security and competent control. Far from being welcome, the insecurity and uncertainty thus engendered is at least as antipathetic, disturbing, and unpleasant as stimulus privation. Novel patterns may also result from the invention of a new strategy that accords with prevalent stylistic rules. Though they may initially seem to threaten existing competencies, the function and significance of novel strategies within the larger set of stylistic constraints can usually be grasped without too much delay or difficulty. For a while the tensions produced by strategic innovation may seem disturbing. But in the end, when our grasp of the principles ordering events is confirmed and our sense of competency is reestablished and control is reinforced, tension is resolved into an elation that is both stimulating and enjoyable. Most novel patterns—original themes, rhythms, harmonic progressions, and so forth—involve the innovative instantiation or realization of an existing strategy or schema .3 Novelties of this kind not only enhance our sense of control—a feeling that we know how things really “work”—but provide both the pleasure of recognition and the joy of skillfully exercising some competency. We enjoy novelty—the stimulation of surprise, the tension of uncertainty—as long as it can be accommodated within a known and understandable set of constraints. When the rules governing the game are abrogated or in doubt—when comprehension and control are threatened—the result is usually anger, anguish, and desperation.These responses to novelty are consequences of fundamental and poignant verities of the human condition: the centrality of choice in human behavior. Because only a minute fraction of human behavior seems to be genetically specified, choice is inescapable.While in lower organisms, behavior is strictly determined by the genetic program, in complex metazoa the genetic program becomes less constraining, more “open” as Ernst Mayr puts it, in the sense that it does not lay down behavioral instructions in great detail but rather permits some choice and allows for a certain freedom of response. Instead of imposing rigid prescriptions, it provides the organism with potentialities and capacities. This openness of the genetic program increases with evolution and culminates in mankind.4The price of freedom is the imperative of choice. Human beings must choose were to sow and when to reap, when to work and where to live, when to play and what to build. Intelligent, successful choices are possible only if alternative courses of action can be imagined and their consequences envisaged with reasonable accuracy. 2. For further discussion, see my Music, the Arts, and Ideas , p. 50.3. Rules are transpersonal but intracultural constraints—for instance, the pitch/time entities established in some style, as well as grammatical and syntactic regularities. Strategies are general means for actualizing some of the possibilities that are potential in the rules of the style. The rules of a style are relatively few, while the number of possible strategies may, depending upon the nature of the rules, be very large indeed. The ways of instantiating a particular strategy are, if not infinite, at least beyond reckoning.4. François Jacob, The Possible and the Actual , p. 61. See also Stephen Jay Gould, Ever Since Darwin , p. 257. (shrink)

In 1966 Gene Roddenberry, then a relatively unknown TV writer, created what was to become a cultural sensation. From cell phones and tablets, to MRI machines and medical jet injectors, Star Trek has undoubtedly anticipated much of the technology that we take for granted today. Moreover, the disagreements, fights and jokes between Captain Kirk (William Shatner), Dr Leonard ‘Bones’ McCoy (DeForest Kelley) and Mr Spock (Leonard Nimoy) were expertly crafted for dramatic impact. But I’m not writing this to (...) confess to you my obsessive infatuation with the Star Trek universe. Instead I want to discuss how the beliefs and practices of Vulcans like Spock are similar to those of the Stoic school of philosophy. (shrink)

This is Volume 9 of Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy. It contains papers on democracy, the law, political liberalism, voting, social experimentation, state neutrality, equality and incentives, self-ownership, drugs and prostitution, and Lincoln. Chapters include: “Challenging Democratic Commitments: On Liberal Arguments for Instrumentalism About Democracy” (Daniel Viehoff); “Emotional Abuse and the Law” (Elizabeth Brake); “Practical Political Liberalism” (Caleb Perl); “Beyond the Voting Debate” (Brookes Brown); “Social Experimentation in an Unjust World” (Jacob Barrett and Allen Buchanan); “State Neutrality and the Dismantling (...) of the Gendered Division of Labour” (Anca Gheaus); “If It’s Not Your Talent, How Come You’re Getting an Incentive?” (Peter Dietsch); “(Owning) our Bodies, (Owning) our Selves?” (Sean Aas); “Self-Sovereignty, Drugs, and Prostitution” (Peter de Marneffe); “Lincoln as Political Philosopher” (William A. Edmundson). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 61.2 (2000) 167-187 [Access article in PDF] Amelot de La Houssaye (1634-1706) Annotates Tacitus Jacob Soll Thousands have worked on Tacitus. Some have translated him, others have commented on him. Some have put his text into paraphrases, because of his obscurity: Some others have sucked out the juice and marrow, which is to say, the Sentences, Aphorismes, Apophtegms, and the Political Axioms, of (...) which he is as fertile, as he is sterile in words. His Translators have made him speak every Language, well or badly, according to what they understood or did not. Of his Commentators, some, as if they were Grammarians, have only picked through his Latin, and his fashions of speaking, which are all extraordinary. The others, like students of Politics, neither stopping to look at his phrases, nor his diction, have studied to penetrate the mysteries, and the secrets of the Art-of-governing, of which he has been the Master, and universal Oracle, for more than five-hundred years. 1Thus wrote Nicolas-Abraham Amelot de La Houssaye in the preface of his book, Tibère: Discours politiques sur Tacite (Paris: chez Frédéric Léonard, 1684). He was describing what has become known as the Tacitist movement of political theory, based on the work of the Roman historian Tacitus, which began in the 1580s and lasted until the French Revolution. 2 The practice of translating, commenting [End Page 167] on, or writing like Tacitus began in earnest in the late sixteenth century. Authoritative Latin editions as well as vernacular translations flourished and great kings turned to these now accessible texts as manuals for ruling. 3 Tacitus provided examples from history which could be used to form the basis of a practical political "science." Alongside Machiavelli, practitioners of reason of state placed the works of Tacitus as the founding stones of their humanist canon of secular political philosophy. 4 Marc-Antoine Muret began teaching Tacitus at the University of Rome in 1580, and at the same time Justus Lipsius and Carolus Paschalius began a Latinist tradition of commenting on Tacitus's works. 5 Lipsius, by far the most influential of the sixteenth-century Tacitists, was not only a philologist interested in reestablishing Tacitus's original text but also a commentator who sought to extract moral and political sententiae from the Roman historian. 6 Thus humanist scholarly practices served as the basis of Tacitean political theory as historical exempla, verified by philology, became useful for practical politics. 7 Scholarship and secular political science were bound for the long journey into the modern age. 8 [End Page 168]If humanist scholarship formed the basis of Tacitean political theory, it is also the key for understanding how it worked. Tacitism was an editorial practice and thus scholarly editors became political theorists. Justus Lipsius did not attempt to write his own version of a Tacitean Annales. Instead, he chopped up Tacitus's text, making a commonplace notebook for absolutist princes with his Politicorum libri sex (Leiden: Plantin, 1589). 9 Understanding the Lipsian tradition--the process by which Tacitus was read, broken down and "represented" by scholarly editors--clarifies an unexplored yet essential element of the evolution of secular political theory from a tool of Absolutism to an arm of revolutionary republicanism. 10The most striking example of the Lipsian tradition can be found in the works of Amelot de La Houssaye, whose vision of Tacitean scholarship we have already seen. Between 1670 and his death in 1706 Amelot was the most prolific translator and commentator of Tacitus in France. Between 1676 and 1808, at least 107 editions of 23 different works by Amelot were published in French, almost all Tacitean in nature. 11 These books were widely read and inspired numerous foreign editions. The unifying thread of this extraordinarily large corpus of works is Amelot de La Houssaye's fascination with Tacitus. He not only translated and commented on Tacitus; he also represented the major works of secular political philosophy of his time as Tacitean in origin. Machiavelli, for example, was "proven... (shrink)

Feminist argumentation theorists have criticized the Dominant Adversarial Model in argumentation, according to which arguers should take proponent and opponent roles and argue against one another. The model is deficient because it creates disadvantages for feminine gendered persons in a way that causes significant epistemic and practical harms. In this paper, I argue that the problem that these critics have pointed out can be generalized: whenever an arguer is given a role in the argument the associated tasks and norms of (...) which she cannot fulfill, she is liable to suffer morally significant harms. One way to react to this problem is by requiring arguers to set up argument structures and allocate roles so that the argument will be reasons-reflective in as balanced a way as possible. However, I argue that this would create to heavy a burden. Arguers would then habitually have to take on roles that require them to divert time and energy away from the goals that they started arguing for and instead serve the goal of ideal reasons-reflectiveness. At least prima facie arguers should be able to legitimately devote their time and energy towards their own goals. This creates a problem: On the one hand, structures that create morally significant harms for some arguers should be avoided—on the other hand, arguers should be able to take argument-roles that allow them to devote themselves to their own argumentative goals. Fulfilling the second requirement for some arguers will often create the morally significant harms for their interlocutors. There are two possible solutions for this problem: first, arguers might be required to reach free, consensual agreements on the structure they will adopt for their argument and the way they will distribute argumentative roles. I reject this option as both fundamentally unfeasible and practically unrealistic, based on arguments developed by theorists like Krabbe and Jacobs. I argue that instead, we should take a liberal view on argument ethics. Arguers should abide by moral side constraints to their role taking. They should feel free to take roles that will allow them to concentrate on their argumentative goals, but only if this does not create a situation in which their interlocutors are pushed into a role that that they cannot effectively play. (shrink)

In his work, the philosopher John Haugeland (1945–2010) proposed a radical expansion of philosophy's conceptual toolkit, calling for a wider range of resources for understanding the mind, the world, and how they relate. Haugeland argued that “giving a damn” is essential for having a mind—suggesting that traditional approaches to cognitive science mistakenly overlook the relevance of caring to the understanding of mindedness. Haugeland's determination to expand philosophy's array of concepts led him to write on a wide variety of subjects that (...) may seem unrelated—from topics in cognitive science and philosophy of mind to examinations of such figures as Martin Heidegger and Thomas Kuhn. Haugeland's two books with the MIT Press, Artificial Intelligence and Mind Design, show the range of his interests. -/- This book offers a collection of essays in conversation with Haugeland's work. The essays, by prominent scholars, extend Haugeland's work on a range of contemporary topics in philosophy of mind—from questions about intentionality to issues concerning objectivity and truth to the work of Heidegger. Giving a Damn also includes a previously unpublished paper by Haugeland, “Two Dogmas of Rationalism,” as well as critical responses to it. Finally, an appendix offers Haugeland's outline of Kant's "Transcendental Deduction of the Categories.” -/- Contributors Zed Adams, William Blattner, Jacob Browning, Steven Crowell, John Haugeland, Bennett W. Helm, Rebecca Kukla, John Kulvicki, Mark Lance, Danielle Macbeth, Chauncey Maher, John McDowell, Joseph Rouse. (shrink)

Steven Crowell’s book is a welcome addition to the literature in phenomenology as well as a demonstration of the importance of phenomenology for those working in other areas of contemporary philosophy, especially those areas of Anglo-American philosophy concerned with normativity, meaning and the philosophy of action. Through a series of thirteen independent but thematically linked essays, he offers a novel account of the importance of normativity to phenomenology, a carefully argued re-thinking of the Husserlian and early Heideggerian accounts of (...) intentionality in light of this account, and ample considerations of the relevance of this reading—and of the classical phenomenological tradition more generally—for broader issues of contemporary philosophical concern... (shrink)

In “On what matters: Personal identity as a phenomenological problem” (2020), Steven Crowell engages a number of contemporary interpretations of Husserl’s account of the person and personal identity by noting that they lack a phenomenological elucidation of the self as commitment. In this article, in response to Crowell, I aim to show that such an account of the self as commitment can be drawn from Husserl’s work by looking more closely at his descriptions from the time of Ideas and (...) after of the self as ego or I and egoic experience as attentive experience. I specifically aim to sketch the beginning of a response to three questions I take Crowell to be posing to a Husserlian account of the person and personal identity: (1) What more than pre-reflective self-awareness can be attributed to the self on phenomenological grounds so that we can understand, phenomenologically speaking, how selves become persons? (2) How can what characterizes the self in addition to pre-reflective self-awareness be discerned in both our commitment to truth and our feeling bound by love and other emotive commitments that cannot be fully rationally justified, which Husserl acknowledges are both sources of personal self-constitution? And (3), do all selves become persons? In the paper I elaborate how my answers to the first two questions turn on the self not just being self-aware but active in a particular sense. And to begin to address the third question, I suggest that while any form of wakeful conscious experience is both self-aware and active, this activity of the self makes a difference for those who are socio-historically embedded in the way we are. Specifically, on the proposed Husserlian account, selves that are socio-historically embedded become persons in and through their active relating to what they attentively experience. In concluding, I indicate how this Husserlian account might compare to Crowell’s claim that “self-identity (ipseity) is not mere logical identity (A=A) but a normative achievement […] which makes a ‘personal’ kind of identity possible” (2020). (shrink)

Born in 1918 in New York, awarded a doctorate in analytical chemistry (1944), Leonard K. Nash enjoyed a distinguished career at Harvard, holding a chair of chemistry from 1959 to 1986. Conducting research in thermodynamics and statistical mechanics, Nash authored successful textbooks, some of which remain in print (e.g. Elements of Chemical Thermodynamics, and Elements of Statistical Thermodynamics).This essay describes the theory of science that Nash developed in a book he published in 1963, The Nature of the Natural Sciences. (...) The present author is of the view that Nash's neglected theory is worth retrieving, as one that is likely to kindle the interest of historians of metascience on several counts. Part of .. (shrink)

CONTENTS Tom Nenon: Freedom, Responsibility, and Self-Awareness in Husserl Steven Galt Crowell: Authentic Thinking and Phenomenological Method Burt C. Hopkins: Authentic and Symbolic Numbers in Husserl's Philosophy of Arithmetic Karl Schuhmann: The Development of Speech Act Theory in Munich Phenomenology Gianfranco Soldati: Early Phenomenology and the Origins of Analytic Philosophy Heribert Boeder: The Submodern Character of Linguistic Analysis Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert: On Oskar Becker's Phenomenological Aesthetics Orrin F. Summerell: Identity, Subjectivity, and Being Other than the Same: Thinking beyond Hegel and (...) Heidegger George Heffernan: Language, Logic, and Logocentrism in Transcendental Phenomenology Edmund Husserl: Philosophy as Rigorous Science (1911) (new translation) Edmund Husserl: On the Task of Logic (1898), ed. and intro. Karl Schuhmann (German/English) Johannes Daubert: Remarks on the Psychology of Apperception and Judgment (1902), ed. and intro. Karl Schuhmann (German/English) Jacob Klein: The Problem of Truth (1924). (shrink)

CONTENTS Carlo Ierna: The Beginnings of Husserl's Philosophy. Part 1: From ber den Begriff der Zahl to Philosophie der Arithmetik Robin Rollinger: Scientific Philosophy, Phenomenology, and Logic: The Standpoint of Paul Linke\ Nicholas deWarren:The Significance of Stern's "PrSsenzzeit" for Husserl's Phenomenology of Inner Time-Consciousness Sen Overgaard: Being There: Heidegger's Formally Indicative Concept of "Dasein" Panos Theodorou: Perceptual and Scientific Thing: On Husserl's Analysis of 'Nature-Thing' in Ideas II Nam-In-Lee: Phenomenology of Feeling in Husserl and Levinas Wai-Shun Hung:Perception and Self-Awareness in (...) Merleau-Ponty:The Problem of the Tacit Cogito in the Phenomenology of Perception Ivan Chvatfk: Plato's Phaedo as an Aesopian Fable about the Immortal Soul Joshua Kates: Two Versions of Husserl's Late History: Jacob Klein and Jacques Derrida and the Problem of Modernity L. William Stern: Mental Presence-Time (English/German) Edmund Husserl: Lecture on the Concept of Number (WS 1889/90) (English/German) Martina Stieler: Memories of Edmund Husserl Sen Overgaard: Transcendental Phenomenology and the Question of Transcendence: A Discussion of Damian Byers's Intentionality and Transcendence Damian Byers: Method and Discovery in Phenomenology: A Reply to Sen Overgaard Sen Overgaard: Inside Phenomenology: A Reply to Damian Byers. (shrink)

CONTENTS James G. Hart: Wisdom, Knowledge, and Reflective Joy: Aristotle and Husserl Wayne Martin: Judgment Stroke-Truth Predicate: Frege and the Phenomenology of Judgment David R. Cerbone: Distance and Proximity in Phenomenology: Husserl and Heidegger Ra·l GutiTrrez: "The Logic of Decadence": Deficient Forms of Government in the Republic Heribert Boeder: Derrida's Endgame Jacques Derrida: Phenomenology and the Closure of Metaphysics (1966) Hans Rainer Sepp: Jan Patocka and Cultural Difference Carl Friedrich Gethmann: Hermeneutic Phenomenology and Logical Intuitionism: On Oskar Becker's Mathematical Existence (...) Essays in Honor of Heribert Boeder by Dennis J. Schmidt, Claus-Artur Scheier, Klaus Erich Kaehler, Franco Volpi, Martfn Zubirfa, Burt Hopkins, and Marcus Brainard Edmund Husserl: The Idea of a Philosophical Culture (1923) Johannes Daubert: Notes from Husserl's Mathematical-Philosophical Exercises (1905), ed. and intro. Mark van Atten and Karl Schuhmann (German/English) Jacob Klein: On Aristotle Eugen Fink and Jan Patocka: On the Phenomenological Reduction. (shrink)

CONTENTS James G. Hart: Wisdom, Knowledge, and Reflective Joy: Aristotle and Husserl Wayne Martin: Judgment Stroke-Truth Predicate: Frege and the Phenomenology of Judgment David R. Cerbone: Distance and Proximity in Phenomenology: Husserl and Heidegger Ra·l GutiTrrez: "The Logic of Decadence": Deficient Forms of Government in the Republic Heribert Boeder: Derrida's Endgame Jacques Derrida: Phenomenology and the Closure of Metaphysics Hans Rainer Sepp: Jan Patocka and Cultural Difference Carl Friedrich Gethmann: Hermeneutic Phenomenology and Logical Intuitionism: On Oskar Becker's Mathematical Existence Essays (...) in Honor of Heribert Boeder by Dennis J. Schmidt, Claus-Artur Scheier, Klaus Erich Kaehler, Franco Volpi, Martfn Zubirfa, Burt Hopkins, and Marcus Brainard Edmund Husserl: The Idea of a Philosophical Culture Johannes Daubert: Notes from Husserl's Mathematical-Philosophical Exercises, ed. and intro. Mark van Atten and Karl Schuhmann Jacob Klein: On Aristotle Eugen Fink and Jan Patocka: On the Phenomenological Reduction. (shrink)

CONTENTS David Vessey: Who was Gadamer's Husserl? Daniel Dahlstrom: The Intentionality of Passive Experience: Husserl and a Contemporary Debate Ulrich Melle: The Enigma of Expression: Husserl's Doctrines of Sign and Expression in the Manuscripts for the Revision of the VIth Logical Investigation John Noras: A Reconsideration of Husserl's Notion of Transcendental Reflection from a Merleau-Pontian Perspective Rochus Sowa: Essences and Eidetic Laws in Edmund Husserl's Descriptive Eidetics Kevin Aho: Logos and the Poverty of Animals: Rethinking Heidegger's Humanism Joeseph Schear: Judgment (...) and Ontology in Heidgger's Phenomenology Ivo De Gennaro: Why Being Itself and not just Being? Joe Sachs: An Informal Talk about Forms Texts and Documents Gerhard Kruger: The Origin of Philosophical Self-Consciousness (1933) Oskar Becker: The Diairetic Generation of Platonic Ideal Numbers (1934) Jacob Klein: Plato's Republic (1967) Dorion Cairns: Some Applications of Husserl's Theory of Sense-Transfer In Review James Despres: Walter Brogan, Heidegger and Aristotle: The Twofoldness of Being. (shrink)

CONTENTS Carlo Ierna: The Beginnings of Husserl's Philosophy. Part 1: From ber den Begriff der Zahl to Philosophie der Arithmetik Robin Rollinger: Scientific Philosophy, Phenomenology, and Logic: The Standpoint of Paul Linke\ Nicholas deWarren:The Significance of Stern's "PrSsenzzeit" for Husserl's Phenomenology of Inner Time-Consciousness Sen Overgaard: Being There: Heidegger's Formally Indicative Concept of "Dasein" Panos Theodorou: Perceptual and Scientific Thing: On Husserl's Analysis of 'Nature-Thing' in Ideas II Nam-In-Lee: Phenomenology of Feeling in Husserl and Levinas Wai-Shun Hung:Perception and Self-Awareness in (...) Merleau-Ponty:The Problem of the Tacit Cogito in the Phenomenology of Perception Ivan Chvatfk: Plato's Phaedo as an Aesopian Fable about the Immortal Soul Joshua Kates: Two Versions of Husserl's Late History: Jacob Klein and Jacques Derrida and the Problem of Modernity L. William Stern: Mental Presence-Time Edmund Husserl: Lecture on the Concept of Number Martina Stieler: Memories of Edmund Husserl Sen Overgaard: Transcendental Phenomenology and the Question of Transcendence: A Discussion of Damian Byers's Intentionality and Transcendence Damian Byers: Method and Discovery in Phenomenology: A Reply to Sen Overgaard Sen Overgaard: Inside Phenomenology: A Reply to Damian Byers. (shrink)

Classic analysis of the subject and the development of personal probability; one of the greatest controversies in modern statistcal thought.

It has been claimed that Massimi’s recent perspectival approach to science sits in tension with a realist stance. I shall argue that this tension can be defused in the quantum context by recasting Massimi’s perspectivalism within a phenomenological framework. I shall begin by indicating how the different but complementary forms of the former are manifested in the distinction between certain so-called ‘-epistemic’ and ‘-ontic’ understandings of quantum mechanics, namely QBism and Relational Quantum Mechanics, respectively. A brief consideration of Dieks’ perspectivism (...) will then lead to a consideration of the much-maligned and typically dismissed role of the observer in the measurement process. This opens the door to London and Bauer’s presentation of a form of ‘phenomenological quantum perspectivalism’ that brings together Massimi’s two forms and explicitly eschews the ‘naïve’ realism that creates the above tension. I shall conclude with some reflections on how intersubjectivity can still be established within this framework, focusing in particular on how Massimi’s idea of ‘interlacing’ scientific perspectives can be accommodated, using the example of a ‘new cosmopolitanism’ that gave rise to Bose-Einstein statistics. (shrink)